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NO MORE SECRET ADOPTIONS: PROVIDING UNWED
BIOLOGICAL FATHERS WITH ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE
FLORIDA PUTATIVE FATHER REGISTRY
TIMOTHY L. ARCARO*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the Florida Legislature approved sweeping changes to
Florida's codified Adoption Act. At the heart of these changes was the
promulgation of the Florida Putative Father Registry.' The 2003 Florida
Adoption Act created a legal presumption that every unwed biological
father in Florida had knowledge of the existence of the registry and its
requirements even though the father received no actual notice.2 This
presumption ultimately worked as a waiver of parental rights for those
fathers who failed to timely register. Unwed biological fathers who
registered properly preserved their right to receive actual notice of an
intended adoption involving their offspring. Where an unwed biological
father established compliance with the additional requirements set forth in
the statute, his consent to the adoption would also be required.4
* The author wishes to thank Professor Michael Dale for his invaluable contributions to
this project and Professor Joel Mintz for his thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts.
1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054 (West 2005) (setting forth the "[a]ctions required by an
unmarried biological father to establish parental rights").
2 But see id. § 63.063(4)(d) (stating that out of state fathers were not required to
register because "an unmarried biological father who resides in another state may not, in
every circumstance, be reasonably presumed to know of and comply with the requirements
of this chapter").
3 See id. § 63.063(4) (listing registration requirements with which out-of-state unwed
biological fathers must comply).
4 Id. § 63.062(2). The statute sets out the compliance requirements:
With regard to a child who is younger than [six] months of age at the
time the child is placed with the adoptive parents, an unmarried
biological father must have demonstrated a full commitment to his
parental responsibility by having performed all of the following acts
prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption:
1. Filed a notarized claim of paternity form with the Florida Putative
Father Registry within the Office of Vital Statistics of the Department
(continued)
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The 2003 Florida Adoption Act obligated the Florida Department of
Health to publicize the Florida Putative Father Registry.5 Regardless of the
Department's publicity efforts, however, unwed biological fathers were
legally presumed to know and understand their legal obligations relating to
the Registry requirements.6 While an unwed biological father was entitled
to receive an adoption disclosure relating to an intended adoption of his
offspring, that document did not provide any reference to the Florida
Putative Father Registry.7 The 2003 Adoption Act raised constitutional
concerns regarding the Registry because the Act failed to provide actual
notice to unwed biological fathers in adoption proceedings, it eradicated all
defenses for failing to register with the Registry, and it created a series of
questionable legal presumptions. The Florida Supreme Court had the
opportunity to address these issues in Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A.8 The
court chose to avoid the constitutional issues implicated in the statute by
of Health, which form shall be maintained in the confidential registry
established for that purpose and shall be considered filed when the
notice is entered in the registry of notices from unmarried biological
fathers.
2. Upon service of a notice of an intended adoption plan or a petition
for termination of parental rights pending adoption, executed and filed
an affidavit in that proceeding stating that he is personally fully able
and willing to take responsibility for the child, setting forth his plans for
care of the child, and agreeing to a court order of child support and a
contribution to the payment of living and medical expenses incurred for
the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth in accordance with his
ability to pay.
3. If he had knowledge of the pregnancy, paid a fair and reasonable
amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the mother's
pregnancy and the child's birth, in accordance with his financial ability
and when not prevented from doing so by the birth mother or person or
authorized agency having lawful custody of the child.
Id. § 63.062(2)(b).
5 Id. § 63.054(11); Tamar Lewin, Unwed Fathers Fight for Babies Placed for Adoption
by Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, § 1, at 1.
6 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.053(2).
7 See id. § 63.085.
8 963 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2007).
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reconciling the statutory language to provide actual notice of intended
adoptions to putative fathers. 9 Although the court resolved the notice
issue, other questions regarding the construction, application, and
constitutionality of the Florida Putative Father Registry remain.
In Part II of this article, I will explain the operation of Florida's
Putative Father Registry system and the legal presumptions placed on
unwed biological fathers as set forth in Florida's codified adoption act. In
Part III, I will review the four Supreme Court decisions that have
established the parameters of putative father rights in adoption cases. In
Part IV, I will examine criticisms of the Florida Putative Father Registry
system and their relevance after Heart of Adoptions. In Part V, I will
explain the rationale and impact of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
Heart of Adoptions. In Part VI, I will examine unanswered questions left
in the wake of the Supreme Court of Florida's ruling in Heart of
Adoptions. Lastly, I will offer my conclusions in Part VII with a summary
of putative father rights in Florida post Heart of Adoptions.
II. FLORIDA'S PUTATIVE FATHER REGISTRY
The Florida Legislature initially created the Registry in 2001 as a way
to strengthen the goals of permanency, stability, and finality in all adoption
matters.10  Accordingly, Florida's codified adoption act provided
absolutely no relief under any circumstances to an unwed biological father
who failed to timely register."
In 2003, the Florida Legislature amended section 63.054 of the Florida
Statutes in order to create the Florida Putative Father Registry when
Governor Jeb Bush signed the bill into law on May 30, 2003.12 Florida's
Registry was designed to operate similarly to other state registries in that
any man who believed he had fathered a child out of wedlock could file a
claim of paternity with the Registry indicating his desire and intention to
9 Id. at 200. The adoption agency must provide the notice. Id. Effective July 1, 2008,
the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Heart ofAdoptions was codified by the legislature
in section 63.062 of the Florida Statutes, which requires notice of intended adoptions be
provided to putative fathers and allows them up to thirty days to register with the putative
father registry. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(3) (West Supp. 2008).
10 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022(1)(bHd) (West 2005).
" See id. § 63.053(1).12 Jennafer Neufeld & Dalia Georgi, In re: Adoption of a Minor Child, 11 J. GEN. Soc.
POL'Y&L. 1199, 1212 (2003).
2008]
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
be legally responsible for his offspring. 13 In order for that claim to be
timely filed in Florida, it must have been filed at any time prior to the birth
of the child or prior to the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights. 
14
Even though timely registration would preserve an unwed biological
father's right to notice of any subsequent adoption proceeding, unwed
biological fathers were not otherwise entitled to actual notice of the
Registry requirements. 15  Florida law presumed that "[a]n [unwed]
biological father, by virtue of the fact that he has engaged in a sexual
relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and
an adoption proceeding regarding that child may occur.' 16  This
presumption coupled with the statutory time constraints for timely
registration, required prompt action on the part of an unwed biological
father who affirmatively sought to protect his interest in his offspring.' 7 In
fact, timely registration in Florida was the only way an unwed biological
father could transform his inchoate interest in his offspring to a
constitutionally protected relationship when the child was being placed for
adoption prior to six months of age.1 8 Failure to timely register constituted
a complete and final waiver of parental rights. 19
13 Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1031, 1032, 1039-40 (2002) (providing a full discussion of various state
approaches to putative father registries).
14 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054(1).
'" Id. § 63.053(2).
16Id. § 63.088(1).
17 Id. § 63.022(l)(e). As to unwed fathers, the Legislature found:
An unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during the
pregnancy and after the child's birth. The state has a compelling
interest in requiring an unmarried biological father to demonstrate that
commitment by providing appropriate medical care and financial
support and by establishing legal paternity rights in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter.
Id.
18 Id. § 63.053(2). The statute reads, in part:
The Legislature finds that the interests of the state, the mother, the
child, and the adoptive parents described in this chapter outweigh the
(continued)
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When a birth mother intended to place her child for adoption in
Florida, an unwed birth father was entitled to receive a statutorily
mandated adoption disclosure form.20  However, this document, which
referenced important "Facts Regarding Adoption Under Florida Law,"
failed to provide any information regarding the Registry or how an unwed
biological father may go about protecting his rights.21 An unwed birth
father was presumed to know the Florida registry law or rely on the Florida
Health Department Office of Vital Statistics, which was responsible for
creating, maintaining, and publicizing the Registry within "existing
resources." 22 Apparently, however, the Florida Health Department was not
effective in publicizing the Registry because only forty-seven men
registered in 2004 even though 90,000 children were born out of wedlock
in Florida that year.23
For unwed birth fathers in Florida, registration was only the first step
in the process of attempting to transform the inchoate relationship with
their newborn child into a constitutionally protected relationship.24 After
registration, Florida law required an unwed father to file a commitment
interest of an unmarried biological father who does not take action in a
timely manner to establish and demonstrate a relationship with his child
in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.
Id.
'9 Id. § 63.062(2)(d). Elsewhere, the statutes reflect that:
the Legislature prescribes the conditions for determining whether an
unmarried biological father's actions are sufficiently prompt and
substantial so as to require protection of a constitutional right. If an
unmarried biological father fails to take the actions that are available to
him to establish a relationship with his child, his parental interest may
be lost entirely, or greatly diminished, by his failure to timely comply
with the available legal steps ....
Id. § 63.053(1).
20 Id. § 63.085(1).
21 Id.
22 See id. § 63.054(3)-(12).
23 Bill Kaczor, Supreme Court Hears Adoption Law Debate, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL,
June 5, 2007, at 6B, available at 2007 WLNR 10462418.
24 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(2)(b)(1). For purposes of this article, newborn
children are treated as children under six months of age.
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affidavit in the adoption proceeding indicating that he is fully able and
willing to take responsibility for the child.25 If he had knowledge of the
pregnancy, he would have had to have paid a reasonable amount of the
expenses incurred in connection with the "child's birth, in accordance with
his financial ability to pay. 26 In order for the unwed father to preserve a
claim to his offspring, each of these actions must have been completed
prior to the time the birth mother had executed her consent.27
Although the 2003 Adoption Act stated that an adoption entity "may
serve" upon an unwed birth father notice of an intended adoption plan
involving his offspring, the agency was not compelled to do So.28 The
statute gave the adoption entity complete discretion to determine whether
or not to serve an unwed birth father with an intended adoption plan.29 The
statute also clearly provided that fraud on the birth mother's part could not
serve as grounds to excuse an unwed birth father's failure to register.30
While there may be civil or criminal sanctions to address such fraud, the
unwed birth father could not use a fraud-based argument to excuse his
2 1 Id. § 63.062(2)(b)(2). Upon service of a notice of an intended adoption plan or a
Petition for Termination of Parental Rights Pending Adoption, the father must execute and
file an affidavit in the proceeding stating that:
he is personally fully able and willing to take responsibility for the
child, setting forth his forth his plans for care of the child, and agreeing
to a court order of child support and a contribution to the payment of
living and medical expenses incurred for the mother's pregnancy and
the child's birth in accordance with his ability to pay.
Id.
26 Id. § 63.062(2)(b)(3).
27 Id. § 63.062(2)(b). Failure to complete each of these acts means the father is
"deemed to have waived and surrendered any rights in relation to the child." Id.
§ 63.062(2)(d).
2
1Id. § 63.062(3)(a).
29 Id. The discretionary approach was unique in Florida. See Rebeca Aizpuru,
Protecting the Unwed Father's Opportunity to Parent: A Survey of Paternity Registry
Statutes, 18 REv. LIG. 703, 720 (1999). Many have called for uniform registration
procedures and the sharing of information between state registries as a way to offer greater
protections to unwed biological fathers. Id. at 732; Beck, supra note 13, at 1071-76.30 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.063(1)-(3).
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failure to register.31 Stated affirmatively, fraud by the birth mother and
even the adoption entity could not excuse an unwed birth father's failure to
register because he was presumed to know the Registry requirements.
Under the statute, court inquiry was limited to a determination of whether
an unwed birth father had registered, and if so, whether he financially
supported the child or birth mother during the pregnancy and whether he
could now prove he had a plan to care for the child.32 The 2003 Registry
requirements were much simpler because the threshold inquiry utilized an
objective test for which there were no exceptions and no excuses.33
When children over the age of six months are subject to adoption
proceedings in Florida, the legislature has provided a "substantial
relationship" test between birth fathers and their offspring.34  In
determining whether such a relationship exists, the court will focus on the
unwed father's full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood,
which will include financially supporting one's offspring, and either
regularly visiting the child at least monthly or maintaining regular
communication with the child.35 The court must also consider the unwed
father's ability to complete these tasks and whether or not the birth mother
had prevented such action.36  Professor Laura Oren describes two
categories of fathers affected by putative father registries: "thwarted
fathers"-those that have been denied the opportunity to assert their rights
based upon the birth mother's conduct, and "pop-up pops"-fathers who
made no effort, who appear too late and offer too little, yet seek to assert
their rights to disturb the intended adoption of their offspring.37
The differing approaches to adoptions of newborn children and
children over the age of six months are presumably justified by the fact
there may be sufficient evidence to support the existence of a relationship
with an older child where that may not be true of a newborn child.38 Once
31 Id.
32 Id. § 63.062(2)(b).
3 See id. § 63.062(2)(b)(1).
34 Id. § 63.062(2)(a)(1)(a)--(b).
35 id.
36 Id.
37 Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop-Up Pops?: How to Determine When Putative
Fathers Can Block the Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 153, 154 (2006).
" See Stacy Lynn Hill, Putative Fathers and Parental Interests: A Search for
Protection, 65 IND. L.J. 939, 961-62 (1990). "The problem with th[e] 'relationship'
(continued)
2008]
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the child has entered the world, it is rather easy to examine the actions
taken by an unwed birth father to create a legal relationship with his
offspring. It is also possible to review any evidence presented by the
unwed father to support his effort to create a legally protected parent-child
relationship. However, it is much more difficult to examine the parent-
child relationship during the mother's pregnancy. In that period, the birth
mother's investment and commitment to her unborn child appear to
outweigh the commitment of any man. 39 For unwed biological fathers, the
legal question becomes one of timing: after conception when does the law
determine "[i]f he grasps that opportunity [of parenthood] and accepts
some measure of responsibility for the child's future"? 40
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS IN ADOPTION
MATTERS
The United States Supreme Court has addressed questions involving
the rights and responsibilities of unwed biological fathers to their offspring
on four occasions over the past forty years.4 ' The decisions rendered in
each of those cases frame our modem discussion of unwed biological
fathers' rights and responsibilities in adoption matters. The Court has
made abundantly clear that an unwed biological father must come forward
promptly to assume the responsibilities of parenthood through his own
intentional conduct that reflects a voluntary desire to be legally responsible
for his offspring.42
standard is that it places putative fathers in an almost no-win situation in cases involving
newborn children." Id. at 961.
39 See Cecily L. Helms & Phyllis C. Spence, Take Notice Unwed Fathers: An Unwed
Mother's Right to Privacy in Adoption Proceedings, 20 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 38-39 (2005)
("The mother has invested her body, time and energy in carrying her unborn child. Because
of her investment she becomes immediately vested with the right to make decisions
concerning the welfare of the baby.... [A] biological mother also has an implicit privacy
interest in making welfare decisions on behalf of her child.").
40 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
41 See Lehr, 463 U.S. 248; Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
42 Caban, 441 U.S. at 392.
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A. Stanley v. Illinois (1972)
In Stanley, the United States Supreme Court first examined the rights
of an unwed biological father to his offspring in a child protection
proceeding that did not involve adoption.43 Illinois law presumed all
unwed fathers unfit to parent their offspring even though all married
fathers, regardless whether they were separated or divorced, were
presumed fit to do so.44 Mr. Stanley had intermittingly resided over an
eighteen year period with the three children he had sired and raised.45
Despite this, when the children's mother died, the children were declared
wards of the state.46 State law did not require a parental fitness hearing
prior to removal, and Mr. Stanley's children were declared dependent even
though there was no proof of neglect.47
The United States Supreme Court held that as a matter of due process
all parents are entitled to a hearing to determine their fitness prior to
having their children removed from their custody.48 Additionally, the
Court noted that denying a biological father a hearing, but granting it to
other parents merely because they were married, divorced, or separated, is
contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.49 In Stanley, the Court made clear
that "[t]he private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired
and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection." 50  The Court's examination of Mr.
Stanley's conduct and the interest he demonstrated in his children provided
a roadmap to examine the parameters of unwed father's rights in future
cases.
B. Quilloin v. Walcott (1978)
In Quilloin, the United States Supreme Court rejected an unwed
biological father's efforts to legitimize his eleven-year old child and
41 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646-47.
44id.
4 1 Id. at 646.
46 id.
471 Id. at 646-47.
41 Id. at 657-58.
49 Id. at 658.
'
0Id. at 651.
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prevent the child's adoption by another man.51 Georgia law provided that
only the consent of the mother is required for the adoption of an
illegitimate child.52 The child could only be legitimated if a court so
ordered or if the father married the mother and acknowledged the child as
his own.5 3 The United States Supreme Court held that the Georgia statute
did not deprive the biological father of his rights under the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clauses.54
The child had been in the custody and control of his mother from the
time he was born.55 Mr. Quilloin had not regularly paid child support for
the child, he never married the child's mother, nor did he establish a home
with the mother.56 The mother married another man, who adopted the
child with her consent, and a Petition for Adoption was subsequently
filed.57 Although Mr. Quilloin "attempted to block the adoption and to
secure visitation rights," he was not seeking custody of the child.58
In rejecting Mr. Quilloin's arguments, the Court focused on his efforts
to parent the child and concluded that he "never shouldered any significant
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection,
or care of the child., 59 The Court's focus properly scrutinized the nature of
the father's relationship with the child and the lack of effort demonstrated
by the father. Mr. Quilloin did not act quickly and decisively to protect his
rights and that delay ultimately cost him the relationship with his child. 6°
The Court distinguished this case, because the child was being adopted by
a step-parent and not being placed with a completely new set of parents.6'
51 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
52 Id. at 248 (citing GA. CODE § 74-403(1)-(2) (1975), amended by GA. CODE ANN. § 19-
8-4 (2004)).
53 Id. at 249 (citing GA. CODE §§ 74-101, -103 (1975), amended by GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19-7-20, - 22 (2004)).
4Id. at 256.
" Id. at 247.
56 Id.
57 id.
58 Id.
'9 Id. at 256.
6°Id. at 254.61Id. at 255.
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C. Caban v. Mohammed (1979)
In Caban, the United States Supreme Court again examined the rights
of an unwed biological father in the context of adoption proceedings.62
The Court found that an unwed father is entitled to due process protections
where he demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by actively rearing his children.63 A putative father's interest
in his relationship with his child does acquire substantial constitutional
protection where he affirmatively protects that interest.
64
Mr. Caban was actively involved in the rearing of his children; his
name was on their birth certificate, he lived with them, and he contributed
to the support of his family until the mother left and moved in with another
man whom she subsequently married.65 When the father attempted to
obtain custody of the children from their grandmother who had taken them
to Puerto Rico, the mother petitioned for adoption with her new husband. 66
The petition was subsequently granted and Mr. Caban's parental rights
were terminated.67 While New York law permitted a mother to block an
adoption by withholding her consent, an unwed father did not hold the
same right, even when his parental relationship with the child was
substantial.68
The Court determined that the law prevented "loving fathers from full
participation in the decision whether their children will be adopted and, at
the same time, enable[d] some alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut off the
paternal rights of fathers."6 9 Additionally, the Court explained that the
New York Statute "discriminate[d] against unwed fathers even
when.., they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the
child., 70 Consistent with Stanley and Quillion, the Court found that when
an unwed biological parent develops a relationship with his biological
62 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1979).
63 Id. at 392.
64 Id. at 392-93.
65Id. at 382.
61Id. at 383.
67 Id. at 383-84.
6 1 Id. at 386-87.
69 Id. at 394.
70 id.
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child and accepts some responsibility in the child's future, the father is
afforded constitutional protection.7'
D. Lehr v. Robertson (1983)
In Lehr, the United States Supreme Court would again address the
question of putative father rights in the context of a putative father registry.
New York law mandated notice of adoption proceedings to putative fathers
who registered with the putative father registry or who satisfied a variety of
other statutory tests to preserve their right to notice.72 In Lehr, a child born
out of wedlock was adopted by the man the child's biological mother
married eight months after the child's birth.73 The putative father was not
given notice of the adoption proceeding.74 Mr. Lehr did not register with
the putative father registry nor did he engage in the behavior one would
expect of a responsible parent.75 While he did live with the child's mother
before the child's birth and visited the mother in the hospital when his
child was born, he never lived with the child or the child's mother after
birth, nor did he provide either of them with financial support.76
The Court crystallized the principles annunciated in Stanley, Quilloin,
and Caban by stating that "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to
participate in the rearing of his child,' his interest in the personal contact
with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process
71 See also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
72 Id. at 250-51. Additionally, the law required that notice:
be given to several other classes of possible fathers of children born out
of wedlock-those who ha[d] been adjudicated to be the father, those
identified as the father on the child's birth certificate, those who live[d]
openly with the child and the child's mother and who held themselves
out to be the father, those who ha[d] been identified as the father by the
mother in a sworn written statement, and those who were married to the
child's mother before the child was six months old.
Id. at 251.
73 Id. at 250.
74 id.
75 See id. at 264, 266.
76Id. at 252.
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Clause., 77 The mere existence of a biological link is not constitutionally
protected, but the link does give the biological father an "opportunity that
no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.
The Court determined that Lehr's due process and equal protection rights
were not violated because he had never established any custodial, personal,
or financial relationship with his child.79 Of course, the interest is not
absolute and will only be protected where, as the Lehr Court subsequently
held, the unwed father "grasps that opportunity [which no other male
possesses] and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's
future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and
make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development., 80 The
rights of an unwed father are a counterpart of the responsibilities he has
assumed with respect to his child.81
In Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr, the United States Supreme
Court identified and explained the nature of an unwed father's inchoate
interest in his children, which it held only matures to a constitutionally
protected right where the father accepts some measure of his parental
responsibility. 82  These cases all presented one common thread which
served to bind responsible fathers to their children: "[t]he biological
connection between father and child is unique and worthy of constitutional
protection if the father grasps the opportunity to develop that biological
connection into a full and enduring relationship. 8 3
The United States Supreme Court has long held that natural parents
have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management
of their children." Indeed, "[t]he rights to conceive and to raise one's
children have been deemed 'essential.' ' 85 Parents are presumptively fit
and entitled to the "custody, care, and nurture" of their children absent a
77 Id. at 261 (citation omitted).
78 Id. at 262.
'9 Id. at 267.
'
0 Id. at 262.
" Id. at 257.
82 See id. at 262; Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972).
83 Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1228 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).
84 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
85 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
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showing of unfitness.86 This presumption of parental fitness applies
equally to parents be they married or unmarried.87 A state may not
constitutionally deprive an unwed father of the right to custody and care of
his offspring absent notice and a hearing where particularized findings
must be made to establish the father's unfitness.88
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE FLORIDA PUTATIVE FATHER REGISTRY
SCHEME ADOPTED IN 2003
Having established the constitutional framework for analyzing the
unwed biological father's rights, we can now fully consider many of the
perceived shortcomings found in Florida's Putative Father Registry. Many
suggest the significant legal burdens placed on unwed biological fathers in
the 2003 Act were a direct result of the backlash from a rather insensitive
and unconstitutional effort to require birth mothers to provide notice to
unwed biological fathers.8 9 The notification and publication requirements
of the Florida Adoption Act of 2001 placed significant legal burdens on a
birth mother when she sought to place her child for adoption.90 Where the
birth father's location was unknown, she was forced to conduct a diligent
search to locate him 9' and in some cases, publish the names of men she had
86 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
87 See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
88 Id,
89 See, e.g., Andrew T. Binstock, Note & Comment, Not If, But When?: Dismantling
the Florida Adoption Act of 2001, 10 CARDOzO WOMEN'S L.J. 625, 655 (2004).
90 Id. at 628.
91 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088(4) (West 2005). Where the mother knew the birth father's
name but not his location, a diligent search must be conducted and must include inquiries
concerning:
(a) The person's current address, or any previous address, through an
inquiry of the United States Postal Service through the Freedom of
Information Act;
(b) The last known employment of the person, including the name and
address of the person's employer. Inquiry should be made of the last
known employer as to any address to which wage and earnings
statements (W-2 forms) of the person have been mailed. Inquiry should
be made of the last known employer as to whether the person is eligible
(continued)
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for a pension or profit-sharing plan and any address to which pension or
other funds have been mailed;
(c) Regulatory agencies, including those regulating licensing in the
area where the person last resided;
(d) Names and addresses of relatives to the extent such can be
reasonably obtained from the petitioner or other sources, contacts with
those relatives, and inquiry as to the person's last known address. The
petitioner shall pursue any leads of any addresses to which the person
may have moved. Relatives include, but are not limited to, parents,
brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces, nephews, grandparents,
great-grandparents, former or current in-laws, stepparents, and
stepchildren;
(e) Information as to whether or not the person may have died and, if
so, the date and location;
(f) Telephone listings in the area where the person last resided;
(g) Inquiries of law enforcement agencies in the area where the person
last resided;
(h) Highway patrol records in the state where the person last resided;
(i) Department of Corrections records in the state where the person last
resided;
(j) Hospitals in the area where the person last resided;
(k) Records of utility companies, including water, sewer, cable
television, and electric companies, in the area where the person last
resided;
(1) Records of the Armed Forces of the United States as to whether
there is any information as to the person;
(in) Records of the tax assessor and tax collector in the area where the
person last resided;
(n) Search of one Internet databank locator service; and
(o) Information held by all medical providers who rendered medical
treatment or care to the birth mother and child, including the identity
and location information of all persons listed by the mother as being
(continued)
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sexual intercourse with around the time of conception if more than one
man could be the father.92 The notification laws were widely chided as
insensitive and humiliating, not to mention as an unconstitutional
interference with a birth mother's right to privacy and decisional
autonomy.93 The notice provisions were ultimately held unconstitutional
by Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal.94 In 2003, the Florida
Legislature took a new approach to a putative father's notification right
and instead of focusing on the conduct of the birth mother, it was now the
putative father who would be primarily responsible to protect his right to
receive notification of a pending adoption involving his offspring-the
Florida Putative Father Registry had arrived.
95
A. Due Process and Presumptions
The Florida legislature amended Florida's codified adoption statute in
2003 in order to create the Florida Putative Father Registry. 96 In so doing,
it also created a series of legal presumptions that ultimately focused on
timely registration with the Registry as the starting point for consideration
of an unwed biological father's rights. Failure to timely register
permanently eliminated an unwed birth father from the equation, while
timely registration would preserve a right to receive actual notice of an
intended adoption plan.97
The presumptions began with conception: by virtue of engaging in
sexual intercourse with a woman, an unwed biological father was
"deemed" to be on notice that a pregnancy and an adoption proceeding
financially responsible for the uninsured expenses of treatment or care
and all persons who made any such payments.
Id.
92 Id. § 63.088(5).
93 See Binstock, supra note 89, at 629; Candice Critchfield, Ad Law Encourages Babies'
Abandonment, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 18, 2002, at 27A.
94 See G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
95 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054.
96 See id. (creating the Florida Putative Father Registry).
9' See id. § 63.062(2)(d). At a minimum, the unwed biological father must have timely
registered with the Registry in order to be entitled to notice of any subsequent adoption
proceedings. Id. Chapter 63 imposes additional obligations on unwed fathers. See id
§ 63.062(2)(b)(l)-(3); see also supra notes 30, 35-36 and accompanying text.
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regarding any subsequently born child could occur.98 This "legislative
notice" imposed upon each unwed biological father the affirmative duty to
protect his own rights and interests.99 In order to protect his rights, an
unwed father was presumed to know of his legal obligation to timely
register with the Florida Putative Father Registry.'00 An unwed father was
presumed to know his child may be adopted without his consent unless he
timely registers with the Registry, complies with the other obligations set
forth in the chapter, and demonstrates a prompt and full commitment to his
parental responsibilities.' 10 His act of registering would be the first step
that must be taken in his effort to convert his inchoate interests to a
constitutionally protected relationship.10 2 Unwed fathers that failed to
timely register are deemed to have surrendered and waived any rights to
the child.'0 3
The chief complaint asserted against the Florida Putative Father
Registry scheme was that unwed birth fathers simply had no actual
knowledge of their obligation to register.1l4 The notion that an unwed
male should intuitively know that when he engages in sexual intercourse
with an unmarried woman he must also contact the state and report this
private conduct to preserve a claim to his offspring holds no place in the
history and traditions of American jurisprudence. The legislative
presumption that unwed fathers are presumed to know of their obligation
to register is not only inconsistent with deeply imbedded notions of
privacy, but also unrealistic. This was emphasized by Justice Anstead's
comment when the Supreme Court of Florida was holding oral argument in
Heart of Adoptions in July, 2007. He commented whether "that meant an
unmarried man who has sex with a woman should skip 'smoking the
98 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088(1).
99 Id.
'°°Id. § 63.053(2).
101 Id.
102 See id. § 63.062(2)(b).
103 Id. § 63.054(1). Pursuant to this statute, "a claim of paternity may not be filed after
the date a petition is filed for termination of parental rights." Id. A claim of paternity
would also be untimely where it was filed after the birth mother executed her consent for
adoption. Id. § 63.062(2)(b).
104 See, e.g., Heart of Adoptions, Inc. vs. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 194 (Fla. 2007).
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classic cigarette' and instead immediately tell the Health Department: 'I
want the state to know that I've just had sexual intercourse."" 05
While there exists a general presumption that one knows the law, this
presumption "is limited in its scope by the reason for it, and knowledge of
the law will not be imputed to every person for all purposes."' 0 6 "Where
the fact of knowledge of the law is material, knowledge is presumed; [but]
that presumption is rebuttable, and varies in force with the facts."'
0 7
"[S]uch presumption is rebuttable, varying in force with the facts-strong
in the case of a lawyer, or with respect to general laws which are matters of
common knowledge, and weak, almost nonexistent, in respect to details or
to laws which touch few persons.'
08
The Florida Legislature presumed that every unwed biological father in
every case is unfit and has abandoned his child where he has failed to
timely register with the Florida Putative Father Registry. 109 The reason for
such treatment was clearly addressed in Stanley: "[p]rocedure by
presumption is always cheaper and easier than individual determination.
But when... the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of
competence and care.., it needlessly risks running roughshod over the
important interests of both parent and child [and] therefore cannot
stand.'' °  Florida's presumption automatically terminates any parental
interest an unwed biological father may have even where he has otherwise
dutifully discharged his responsibilities as a parent; that presumption
impermissibly slices too deeply into constitutionally protected interests.
Termination of the unwed biological father's parental rights without notice
and without his consent based upon failing to register is unconstitutional
because it violates his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
105 Kaczor, supra note 23.
'0'31A C.J.S. Evidence § 229 (2008).
107 Schaffer v. Fed. Trust Co., 28 A.2d 75, 76 (N.J. Ch. 1942).
108 29 AM. JuR. 2D Evidence § 290 (2008) (citing Schaffer, 28 A.2d at 78).
'o See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.054(1), 63.062(2)(b)(1) (West 2005). These sections
failed to provide actual notice of adoption proceedings to putative fathers who may have
acquired constitutionally protected rights by virtue of their actions even though they may
have failed to promptly register with the Registry. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.054(1),
63.062(2)(b)(1).
110 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
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as well as his privacy rights under the Florida Constitution, which provides
significant privacy protections beyond those of the Federal Constitution."'
In Lehr, the United States Supreme Court found that a putative father's
interest in his relationship with the child acquires substantial constitutional
protection where the "father demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the
rearing of his child."'12 The Court in Lehr did not rule that putative father
registry schemes were constitutionally permissible where the exclusive test
of parenthood was timely registration. In fact, the Lehr Court found the
putative father registration scheme employed by New York was but one of
many ways that a birth father could seek to protect the inchoate interest in
his offspring; it was not, however, the exclusive means."13
Even where an unwed biological father did not receive notice of an
adoption proceeding but subsequently discovered that his child was being
placed for adoption, he would still be categorically barred from filing a
claim of paternity after a petition for termination of parental rights had
been filed. In In re Adoption of Baby A, 1 4 the Second District Court of
Appeal of Florida grappled with many of the troubling issues presented
where an unmarried father fails to register but subsequently claims
paternity. The court's examination of the statute reflects the illogical and
inconsistent application of various provisions relating to Florida's Putative
Father Registry. Stopping short of declaring the registry unconstitutional,
presumably because the issue was not before the court, the court stated
that:
[fl]or now, those issues must await action by the legislature
or future judicial precedent or must perhaps depend upon
the integrity and vigilance of adoption agencies to take
actions independent of legal requirements (and perhaps
adverse to their own interests) to balance the competing
"' Heart of Adoptions, Inc. vs. J.A-, 963 So. 2d 189, 206 (Fla. 2007) (Lewis, C.J.,
concurring).
112 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Muhammed, 441
U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).
113 See id. at 263-64.
ll4 944 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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interests of biological parents, adoptive parents, and the
child in the adoptions they undertake.' 5
B. Custody Plan
Where an unwed biological father has timely registered with the
Registry, he has preserved his right to receive actual notice of an intended
adoption." 6  Registration is but the first step to transform the inchoate
interest into a statutorily protected right in Florida. An unwed biological
father must also file an affidavit in the adoption "proceeding stating that he
is personally and fully able and willing to take responsibility for the child,
setting forth his plans for care of the child, and agreeing to a court order of
child support."'" 7  This plan of custody or "commitment affidavit"
apparently required an unwed biological father to affirmatively establish
fitness."i8 Florida law provides no guidance on the standards a trial court
should utilize in examining his "plans to care for his child." The
requirement to affirmatively establish an unwed father's plan to rear his
child presumes unfitness on the father's part even though Stanley expressly
rejects such presumptions regarding unwed fathers." 9 Assuming an unwed
biological father has maintained minimal contact with the birth mother
"' Id. at 396.
116 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(2)(b) (West 2005).
"
7 Id. § 63.062(2)(b)(2). The putative father must also agree to contribute "to the
payment of living and medical expenses incurred for the mother's pregnancy and the child's
birth in accordance with his ability to pay." Id.
118 Id. § 63.062(3)(a). The statute provides that:
[tlhe notice of intended adoption plan must specifically state that if the
unmarried biological father desires to contest the adoption plan, he must
file with the court, within [thirty] days after service, a verified response
that contains a pledge of commitment to the child in substantial
compliance with subparagraph (2)(b)2. The notice of intended adoption
plan shall notify the unmarried biological father that he must file a
claim of paternity form with the Office of Vital Statistics within [thirty]
days after service upon him and must provide the adoption entity with a
copy of the verified response filed with the court and the claim of
paternity form filed with the Office of Vital Statistics.
Id.
19 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972).
[37:449
NO MORE SECRET ADOPTIONS
during the pregnancy and registered with the Registry, why should he be
required to produce evidence of his parenting abilities? A birth mother
who decides not to place her child for adoption certainly need not make
such a showing. As acknowledged by many scholarly articles, her
commitment to the child can be demonstrated through her unique genetic
responsibility of carrying the child to term. 120 However, this fact alone is
no guarantee that a pregnant unwed mother will have a better "plan of
custody to care for her child" to the extent the law should excuse her of
such presumptions. Excusing birth mothers from this requirement creates
serious questions regarding Equal Protection under the law.
121
C. Fraud
Consistent with the legal presumptions that underlie the Florida
Putative Father Registry, the Florida Legislature placed one more legal
burden on the shoulders of unwed biological fathers. Unwed biological
fathers are also responsible for preventing any act that constitutes fraud as
it relates to their Registry obligations. 122 The codified adoption statute
places the burden of preventing fraud on the unwed biological father and
prohibits fraud as a defense for non-compliance with his affirmative
120 See, e.g., Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before
and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 372-73 (1984); Robbin Pott Gonzalez,
The Rights of Putative Fathers to Their Infant Children in Contested Adoptions:
Strengthening State Laws that Currently Deny Adequate Protection, 13 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 39, 56-57 (2006).
121 See Mahrukh S. Hussaini, Incorporating Thwarted Putative Fathers Into the
Adoption Scheme: Illinois Proposes a Solution After the "Baby Richard" Case, 1996 U.
ILL. L. REv. 189, 213-17. Hussaini notes that:
[a]lthough a statute may permissibly require some affirmative action
from unwed fathers, it must not unnecessarily limit the ways in which a
putative father can take this affirmative action and manifest his parental
interest. If it does, it has the potential of denying the equal protection of
the laws to putative fathers, who may be as worthy of constitutional as
unwed mothers, and the statute may be stricken as unconstitutional.
Id. at 214.
122 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.063(3).
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Registry obligations. 23 Fraud on the part of the birth mother or even an
adoption agency cannot serve as a basis to halt or overturn a final
adoption.
124
It is certainly possible, however, that an adoption agency, whose sole
function is to locate children for adoption and to be paid for those services,
might provide inaccurate information to an unwed birth father.1 25 It is also
possible that a birth mother would misrepresent the identity of the unwed
birth father or misrepresent her true intention of placing the child for
adoption. A state statute that condones fraudulent behavior against unwed
birth fathers resulting in the permanent deprivation of parental rights thus
appears to be a denial of equal protection and due process.
One example of relief from the strict registry requirements can be
found in the case of In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe. 26 In Baby Boy Doe,
the birth mother intentionally lied to the putative father telling him they
would raise the child together and that she would not place the child for
adoption. 127 Even though the mother's real intention was to place the child
for adoption immediately after birth, the putative father relied on the
mother's statements and thus did not protect his rights. 28  The Utah
Supreme Court ruled the birth mother's intentional misrepresentation,
coupled with the fact the father made clear his intention to rear his child,
123 Id. (stating that "the unmarried biological father is in the best position to prevent"
fraud).
124 Id. § 63.063(2). The statute provides, in part, that:
[a]ny person injured by a fraudulent representation or action in
connection with an adoption is entitled to pursue civil or criminal
penalties as provided by law. A fraudulent representation is not a
defense to compliance with the requirements of this chapter and is not a
basis for dismissing a petition for termination of parental rights or a
petition for adoption, for vacating an adoption decree, or for granting
custody to the offended party.
Id.
125 See, e.g., Gruett v. Nesbitt, 17 P.3d 1090, 1097 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that
the agency misled the putative father by telling him that he had fourteen days to act but then
placed the child with the adoptive parents shortly after the birth).
126 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986).
127 Id. at 687, 690.
121 Id. at 690.
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relieved the father of the obligation to register because "termination of his
parental rights was contrary to basic notions of due process, and.., he
came forward within a reasonable time after the baby's birth.' 1
29
D. Florida's Constitutional Right to Privacy
In Heart of Adoptions, Chief Justice Lewis's concurring opinion goes
beyond statutory analysis to address the additional privacy protections set
forth in the Florida Constitution that should be extended to unmarried
biological fathers. 130 Florida's independent Right to Privacy Clause states
that "[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into the person's private life.' 3 ' This right
"embraces more privacy interests, and extends more protection to the
individual in those interests, than does the federal Constitution.' 32 The
Supreme Court of Florida has not examined the parameters of Florida's
constitutional right to privacy in the context of Florida's Putative Father
Registry.
E. Notice Provisions in Other Florida Proceedings
Some unwed biological fathers have gone beyond Florida's codified
adoption act and argued that they were not prohibited from filing a
paternity action pursuant to chapter 742 of the Florida Statutes, which
requires a paternity determination prior to any termination of parental
rights.' 33 Although the Second District Court's rationale in Baby A for
requiring a paternity determination was ultimately rejected by the Supreme
Court of Florida, 134 the Second District Court exposed the inconsistent
treatment unwed biological fathers experienced in regards to their right to
receive notice of proceedings involving their offspring in Florida. 35 The
129 Id. at 691 (quoting Ellis v. Soc. Servs. Dep't of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980)).3 0 Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 206 (Fla. 2007) (Lewis, C.J.,
concurring).
131 Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23).
132 Id. (quoting N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d
612, 619, 634 (Fla. 2003)).
133 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby A, 944 So. 2d 380, 394-95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
134 See Heart ofAdoptions, 963 So. 2d at 189.
131 In re Adoption of Baby A, 944 So. 2d at 392-93.
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lack of notice to unwed biological fathers in adoption proceedings was
particularly difficult to reconcile given notice provisions in other areas of
the law, such as in dependency and child support proceedings. 3 6 When it
comes to an unwed biological father's asserting his interest in an intended
adoption matter where he has failed to register-as opposed to his failing
to financially support his offspring-it is crystal clear that biology alone is
not enough.
137
V. HEART OF ADOPTIONS V. J.A.: ACTUAL NOTICE OF INTENDED
ADOPTIONS Now REQUIRED
When the Supreme Court of Florida granted review in Heart of
Adoptions, many observers believed the court would resolve the questions
related to an unwed biological father's due process right to receive notice
of an intended adoption through a constitutional analysis of both state and
federal law. 138 Given Florida's enumerated state right of privacy, it was
also believed that the court might provide a substantive analysis of an
unwed biological father's right to grasp the opportunity of parenthood.
39
Important questions such as when and how that right manifests in Florida
would be critical in determining the validity of the Florida Putative Father
Registry.
A. Factual and Procedural History
The purported father of Baby H, J.A., learned of the mother's
pregnancy three months prior to the child's birth. 140 J.A. was not married
136 Id. at 394 n.16, 395 n.21.
137 See Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution: Biology
"Plus" Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 47, 48 (2004) (describing the apparent paradox of providing notice to
putative fathers when a biological link to their offspring alone serves as sufficient
justification for the public fisc but requiring biology-plus as an additional requirement in
adoption matters).
138 Cf Amy U. Hickman & Jeanne T. Tate, Florida's Putative father Registry: More
Work Is Needed to Follow the Established National Trends Toward Stable Adoption
Placements, FLA. B.J., Jan. 2008, at 45.
139 Jeffrey A. Pamess & Therese A. Clarke Arado, Safe Haven, Adoption and Birth
Record Laws: Where Are the Daddies?, 36 CAP. U. L. REv. 207, 215 n.43 (2007).
140 Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 191 (Fla. 2007). Although there was
no transcript of evidentiary findings made during the termination hearing, the stipulated
(continued)
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to the birth mother at the time of her conception nor did he subsequently
marry her. 141 Approximately two weeks prior to the birth of Baby H, the
adoption agency, Heart of Adoptions, Inc., sent a certified letter to J.A.
requesting that he contact the agency regarding "a legal matter involving
[the mother] and her pregnancy."' 142 This correspondence indicated that the
required adoption disclosure form1 43 "was enclosed, and requested that J.A.
sign and return an acknowledgment of receipt of the disclosure."' 44 On
August 1, 2005, four days prior to the birth of Baby H, the adoption agency
"sent J.A. a more detailed letter.., which purported to confirm a
conversation" that took place between a representative of the agency and
J.A. indicating that the birth mother planned to place the child for adoption
and that J.A. could be the biological father.145 That letter also indicated
that J.A.'s failure to provide financial support to the birth mother could be
used to establish abandonment under Florida law and that the birth mother
needed approximately $2,100 per month to meet her living expenses.' 4
6
The letter did not inform J.A. of the Florida Putative Father Registry, nor
did it disclose the affirmative actions J.A. would have to take in order to
preserve his right to receive notice of the adoption proceedings or to
withhold his consent to the adoption. 147
On August 5, 2005, Baby H was born and J.A. filed a pro se petition to
establish paternity and for related relief, seeking to "stop the mother from
allowing the child to be adopted."'148 The next day the birth mother placed
the child for adoption with Heart of Adoptions, Inc. and "executed an
facts submitted by the parties indicate that J.A. claimed to be the biological father and the
birth mother identified J.A. as the biological father. See id. at 191 n.2.
141 See id. at 192.
142 Id. at 191.
143 The Adoption Disclosure Form is mandated by section 63.085 of the Florida Statutes.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
144 Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 191.
145 Id. at 192.
146id.
147 Id.
148 Id. J.A. filed his petition with the assistance of a non-lawyer using the Florida
Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms. Id. J.A.'s petition was filed in Citrus
County, where the child was born, even though the termination case would be litigated in
the Hillsborough County where venue was proper due to the birth mother's waiver of venue
pursuant to section 63.087(2)(a)(3). Id. at 192, 193 n.3.
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affidavit of inquiry regarding the biological father." 149 On August 8, 2005,
three days after both the birth of the child and the filing of J.A.'s petition to
establish paternity, the agency filed a petition to terminate J.A.'s parental
rights. 50  The petition alleged J.A. had physically and financially
abandoned both the mother and the child and that J.A. was not entitled to
notice of the adoption nor could he consent to the adoption because he did
not properly file a claim of paternity with the Florida Putative Father
Registry.' 51 J.A. was served with the petition and filed an answer denying
all allegations.1
52
149 Id. at 192. In her affidavit of inquiry regarding the biological father, the birth mother
made the following statements:
9....
(2) [He] has been informed of my pregnancy and adoption plan but has
not paid a fair and reasonable amount of the expense incurred in
connection with the pregnancy, in accordance with his financial ability.
In fact, the biological father [has] contributed no monies to me or this
child or on our behalf,
(4) [He] did not provide or promise to provide the child or me during
the pregnancy with support in a repetitive customary manner.
10. The biological father, [J.A.], is over the age of eighteen and is
employed. I believe he has sufficient resources so that he could have
provided some financial support to me during the pregnancy, if he so
wished.
11. The biological father is aware that I reside in and can be located in
the State of Florida. At all times during the pregnancy, he has known
how to communicate with me.
12. Because of my limited resources, I have had to rely on assistance
from the prospective adoptive parents, my mother and the State of
Florida in order to provide for myself during the pregnancy.
Id at 192-93. "According to the financial affidavit filed along with the paternity petition,
J.A.'s monthly net income was $1300." Id. at 192.
"5°Id. at 193.
151 Id. The petition for termination alleged abandonment pursuant to sections 63.089,
63.064(1), and 63.032(1) of the Florida Statutes. Id. The petition also alleged J.A.'s failure
(continued)
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The court held a hearing on September 27, 2005, to determine the
status on the petition to terminate J.A.'s parental rights.153 The parties
stipulated that "J.A. did not file a claim of paternity with the Registry or
execute an affidavit stating he was able and willing ... to care for the
child, and agreeing to a court order of support," including expenses
incurred by the birth mother during the pregnancy." 4 They also stipulated
that J.A. was aware of the birth mother's pregnancy at least three months
prior to the birth of Baby H, that "he was aware of the adoption plan at
least three weeks prior to the birth, and [that he] was contacted by the
agency in writing at least twice prior to the birth.' 155 The parties also
stipulated that J.A. was unaware of the Registry requirements. 156 J.A.
argued that he was entitled to notice of the Florida Putative Father
Registry.
157
The trial court rejected J.A.'s mandatory notice claim and ruled that
J.A.'s pending paternity claim did not preclude the entry of an order
terminating J.A.'s parental rights without his consent.' 58 The court found
that J.A.'s consent to the termination of his parental rights or to the
adoption was not required because J.A. had failed to "file a claim of
paternity with the Registry" and failed to file an affidavit with the court
indicating his "willing[ness] to take responsibility for the child."'59 The
trial court did not rule on the abandonment allegations presented in the
mother's petition. 160 At the conclusion of the trial, the "court issued a final
order terminating the parental rights of J.A." and J.A. appealed.
16 1
to "comply with the additional requirements of section 63.062(2) [of the] Florida Statutes."
Id.
152 Id. at 193-94.
153 Id. at 194. No transcript of the hearing exists "because no court reporter was
present." Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. (stating that "although J.A. 'was never presented as a witness or sworn in as one,'
he stated that he did not know about the Registry").
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
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On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the
trial court's judgment of termination of parental rights and remanded.'62
[T]he Second District held that in ruling on a petition for
termination [of parental rights] pending adoption, the trial
court was without authority to terminate the parental rights
of an alleged unmarried biological father who failed to
register with the Registry because he was not a "parent" as
defined in the statutory scheme [of chapter 63].163
Additionally, "[t]he Second District further held that when a paternity
action is pending at the time a petition [to terminate parental rights pending
adoption] is filed, the paternity action should [be resolved] prior to the
conclusion of the petition for termination."'164 The Second District Court
of Appeal of Florida also certified the question presented in this case as
one of great public importance.
165
On July 12, 2007, in Heart of Adoptions, the Supreme Court of Florida
ruled in favor of providing unwed biological fathers with actual notice of
the Florida Putative Father Registry and the legal obligations they must
satisfy if they plan to grasp the opportunity of parenthood.' 66 The court
determined that unwed biological fathers are entitled to receive actual
notice of intended adoption plans involving their offspring and that they
have thirty days to register with the Florida Putative Father Registry after
having received such notice. 167 The court's interpretation of chapter 63
eliminates the discretion of adoption entities, making it mandatory to
provide such notice to biological fathers who were not married to the birth
mother at the time of conception or of the birth of a child. 168  More
162 Id The Second District Court of Appeal of Florida remanded based on its prior
decisions in In re Baby R.P.S., 942 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), and In re
Adoption of Baby A, 944 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). Heart ofAdoptions, 963 So.
2d. at 194.
163 Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d. at 194; see also In re Baby R.P.S., 942 So. 2d at 908-
09; In reAdoption of Baby A, 944 So. 2d at 389.
'64 Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d. at 194; see also In re Adoption of Baby A, 944 So. 2d
at 396.
165 Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 191, 194.
'66 Id. at 202.
167 id.
168 Compare id. at 202 with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(3)(a) (West 2005).
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significantly, the court's ruling provides unwed biological fathers with
actual notice of both the Florida Putative Father Registry and the
affirmative actions required of an unwed biological father who desires both
to establish and preserve his right to be made a party to any proceeding to
terminate his parental rights and to establish that his consent is required to
a proposed adoption. 69  The court determined that the discretionary
language found in section 63.062(3)(a), that "an adoption entity may serve
upon any unmarried biological father ... a notice of intended adoption
plan," was inconsistent with the legislative intent and the statutory scheme
set forth in the Florida Adoption Act codified in chapter 63.17°
B. The Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court of Florida framed the question presented in Heart
of Adoptions as one of statutory interpretation and not one of constitutional
rights. 17' The court's approach to the question presented involved an
analysis of two separate issues intertwined by the statutory scheme
envisioned in Florida's codified adoption statute. The court's first task was
to "determine whether the statutory scheme vest[ed Florida] trial court[s]
with authority to terminate the parental rights of an alleged unmarried
biological father who does not come within the categories of persons
required to consent to adoption."'' 72 "Within this broad question," the court
set forth to determine "under what circumstances the [Florida] Legislature
has required that an adoption entity serve notice on the unmarried
biological father of the steps he must take to preserve his ability to either
consent or withhold his consent to adoption."'
' 73
The court identified the Florida Putative Father Registry as the "central
feature" of the Florida Adoption Act.174  In so doing, the Court went
19See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(2)(b) (laying out the required actions an unwed
biological father must take).
"
70 See Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 199-200. The amended statute now states that
"an adoption entity shall serve a notice of intended adoption upon any known and locatable
unmarried biological father who is identified to the adoption entity by the mother." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 63.062(3) (West Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
' Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 191.
172 1d. at 195. The categories of persons required to consent to an adoption are set forth
in section 63.062(1) of the Florida Statutes.
173 Id.
741d. at 196.
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through a lengthy analysis of the statutory provisions that dictate the rights
and obligations of unwed biological fathers pursuant to Florida law.
Within this comprehensive analysis, the Court ultimately "reject[ed] the
Second District's holding that an unmarried biological father's failure to
timely file with the Registry cannot provide a basis for terminating that
father's parental rights."' 175 The Supreme Court of Florida "conclude[d]
that the Second District disregarded the clear intent of the Legislature in
section 63.062(2)(d) that an unmarried biological father who does not
comply with the requirements of section 63.062(2) is 'deemed to have
waived and surrendered any rights in relation to the child.""' 176 The Court
found that "[t]he entire statutory scheme [set forth in chapter 63] would be
frustrated if' unmarried biological fathers were excused from the Registry
requirements. 177 The Supreme Court of Florida then ruled that Florida trial
courts have authority to terminate parental rights of unwed biological
fathers who fail to register, since registering is an integral function of the
Registry.1
78
The court identified the key question to be "under what circumstances
an adoption entity is required to notify an unmarried biological father of
the steps he must take to preserve his ability to either consent to withhold
his consent to an adoption.' 79 The court then sought to eliminate the
inconsistent language found in the Notice of Adoption Plan Under Act,
which appears to provide discretion to the adoption entity as to when and if
the entity had an obligation to serve a notice of an intended adoption plan
1751Id. at 197.
176 Id.
177 id.
178 Id. at 191. The court's analysis included a review of various provisions of chapter 63
which reflect the legislative intent to require unmarried biological fathers to affirmatively
act to preserve their parental interest in their offspring. See id. at 195-98. "An unmarried
biological father who does not comply with each of the conditions provided in this
subsection is deemed to have waived and surrendered any rights in relation to the
child ..." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(2)(d) (West 2005); see also id. § 63.053(1) (stating
that an unmarried biological father's "parental interest may be lost entirely, or greatly
diminished, by his failure to timely comply with the available legal steps to substantiate a
parental interest"); id. § 63.063(4)(d) (referring to an out of state unmarried biological
father's obligation to "protect and preserve his parental interest").
171 Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 198.
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on an unmarried biological father.'80 To grant such discretion would
render meaningless the legislative intent that adoption entities locate and
provide notice to an unmarried biological father before placement of a
child in an adoptive home.' 8 ' Harmonizing various provisions of the Act
in order to effectuate legislative intent, the court concluded that as a matter
of statutory construction adoption entities are required to serve notice of
the intended adoption plan containing notice of the Registry and affidavit
requirements on unwed biological fathers.18 2 More importantly the court
avoided ruling "on potential constitutional implications to the statutory
scheme, either facially or as applied, by providing... unmarried biological
father[s] a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statutory
requirements.' 8 3  When the provisions of Florida's Putative Father
Registry are "read in pari materia with related provisions of chapter 63,"
the court ruled that the clear legislative intent requires adoption entities to
serve "a known, locatable, unmarried biological father with notice of the
adoption plan," giving him thirty days to file with the Registry.1
8 4
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Lewis went beyond the court's
rationale in an effort to explain the legal nature of the interest an unmarried
biological father has in his newborn child when that child is immediately
180 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(3)(a). This section provides that an adoption agency
may serve upon any unmarried biological father identified by the
mother or identified by a diligent search of the Florida Putative Father
Registry, or upon an entity whose consent is required, a notice of
intended adoption plan at any time prior to the placement of the child in
the adoptive home.
Id. The Second District Court of Appeal of Florida interpreted this provision to mean that
"an adoption agency has the discretion, but not a duty, to notify an unmarried biological
father.., of an intended adoption." In re Adoption of Baby A, 944 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
181 Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 198-99. The court noted that "a basic rule of
statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless
provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute
meaningless." Id. (quoting Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Material Corp., 908 So. 2d
360, 366 (Fla. 2005)).
182 Id. at 200.
183 Id.
14id.
2008] 479
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
placed for adoption at birth. 185  His view of Lehr is consistent with a
number of state court decisions that have established the principal that an
unwed biological father does have a constitutionally protected, inchoate
interest in the opportunity to develop a relationship with the child. 86
While acknowledging authority to the contrary, Chief Justice Lewis
viewed an unwed biological father's opportunity to develop a substantial
relationship with his offspring, where exercised, as the constitutionally
protected inchoate interest. 87 Beyond his interpretation of Lehr, Chief
Justice Lewis viewed Florida's independent Privacy Clause, set forth in the
Florida Constitution, as a separate legal basis for protection of an unwed
biological father's opportunity to develop a "substantial relationship" in
Florida. 188
VI. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The Florida Supreme Court made clear in Heart of Adoptions that
known unwed biological fathers are entitled to actual notice of the Florida
Putative Father Registry and of the registration requirements when an
intended adoption involves their offspring. 189 This pronouncement should
arguably eradicate many of the legal presumptions underlying the 2003
Florida Putative Father Registry that were not otherwise directly addressed
in the Court's opinion. However, the Court failed to resolve at least three
significant issues which most certainly are lying in wait on Florida's
adoption law horizon. They are: birthmother/agency fraud in the adoption
"85 Id. at 205-06 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
116ld. at 205 (citing Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1228-29 (Cal. 1992) (en
banc) (establishing that an unwed biological father has a protected constitutional interest in
the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child which cannot be denied by
immediately placing the child for adoption); In re Petition of Steve B.D., 730 P.2d 942, 945
(Idaho 1986) ("Lehr indicated both that the state may not deny due process and equal
protection to unwed fathers who enjoyed established relationships with their children, and
that the state may not deny unwed fathers the opportunity to establish such relations-what
the Court described as 'the inchoate interest in establishing a relationship with [the
child]....')).
187 Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 206 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
188 Id. The Florida Right of Privacy Clause states that "[e]very natural person has the
right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life."
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
... Heart ofAdoptions, 963 So. 2d at 191.
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process, the "opportunity" question, and Florida's state constitutional right
of privacy.
A. Fraud
Prior to the court's ruling in Heart of Adoptions, an unwed biological
father had no right to receive actual notice of the Putative Father Registry
and no right to receive actual notice of intended adoption proceedings
unless he timely registered with the Florida Putative Father Registry. 90
Failure to timely register effectively terminated his parental rights even
where he may have received fraudulent information regarding his
registration responsibilities. Florida's 2003 codified Adoption Act
eliminated fraud as a defense for failing to register with the Florida
Putative Father Registry.19' Because the Act created an irrebuttable legal
presumption that each unwed biological father living in Florida knew of
his legal responsibility to register, fraud could not be a defense for failing
to register. 92  Stated affirmatively, fraud perpetrated against an unwed
biological father by the birth mother, an adoption entity, an adoption
agency, or any other third party, could not be a defense for failing to
register. Since no unwed biological father could attempt to preserve a
claim to parental rights without registering first, the failure to register was
fatal in every case. The 2003 Act made clear that it was the unwed
biological father who was affirmatively responsible for preventing fraud in
every case. 193  While an unwed biological father may pursue civil or
criminal penalties if he claimed fraud in the adoption process, that same
claim of fraud could not serve as a basis for denying a petition to terminate
his parental rights, nor could it serve as a basis for vacating a final
judgment of adoption. 94
190 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.085 (West 2005). The only document that an unwed birth
father was entitled to receive was the adoption disclosure form which failed to even
mention the Putative Father Registry. Id.
'
9 1See id. § 63.063.
'
92 Id. § 63.063(1)-(3).
'93Id. § 63.063(3) ("The Legislature finds no way to remove all risk of fraud or
misrepresentation in adoption proceedings and has provided a method for absolute
protection of an unmarried biological father's rights ... the unmarried biological father is in
the best position to prevent or ameliorate the effects of fraud and, therefore, has the burden
of preventing fraud.").
194 Id. § 63.063(2).
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Now that identified unwed biological fathers have a right to actual
notice of Registry requirements in intended adoptions involving their
offspring, 95 would it constitute fraud to intentionally violate that right?
The answer would presumptively be yes even though this issue was not
directly addressed by the Heart of Adoptions court. It would certainly
follow that birth mother fraud or fraud perpetrated by an adoption
agency/entity would no longer be permissible as it relates to the integrity of
an intended adoption. It is not entirely clear that the fraud defense will be
resuscitated in Florida, but the court's new construction of unwed
biological fathers' rights would seem to support such a defense. An unwed
biological father's right to receive notice seems to imply legal authority to
enforce that right, which had been the practice in Florida prior the 2003
Registry scheme.'
96
States that provide unwed biological fathers with actual notice of
intended adoptions have sought to protect those rights in cases involving
fraud. 197  Jurisdictions that do not expressly provide relief from strict
registration requirements may have to find exceptions in order to effectuate
justice. Such an exception was found to exist where a birth mother
intentionally lied to the putative father, telling him they would raise the
child together and that she would not place the child for adoption. 98 As a
result of relying on the mother's statements, the putative father did not
register even though the mother's real intention was to place the child for
195 Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 200 (Fla. 2007).
196 As late as 1964, Florida did not respect a father's right to his illegitimate child.
Clements v. Banks, 159 So. 2d 892, 893 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). By 1973, only the
consent of the mother was required to begin adoption proceedings. Toni L. Craig,
Comment, Establishing the Biological Rights Doctrine to Protect Unwed Fathers in
Contested Adoptions, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv 391, 420 (1998). By the late 1990s, however,
this practice was changed to require that "within [sixty] days of filing the petition, the
adoption petitioners must exercise 'good faith and diligent efforts' to notify and obtain
consent from any parent whose consent is required but who has not consented." Id. at 420
n.195 (citing FLA. STAT. § 63.062(3) (1997)) (emphasis added); see also Claire L.
McKenna, Comment, To Unknown Male: Notice of Plan for Adoption in the Florida 2001
Adoption Act, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 789, 792 nl 1 (2004) ("Prior to the 2001 Adoption
Act, Florida law required notice only when the when the father's location or identity were
known.").
197 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.096(8) (2007).
198 In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 687, 690 (Utah 1986).
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adoption immediately after birth.' 99 The Utah Supreme Court ruled the
birth mother's intentional misrepresentation, coupled with the fact the
father made clear his intention to rear his child, relieved the father of the
obligation to register because "termination of his parental rights was
contrary to basic notions of due process, and... he came forward within a
reasonable time after the baby's birth., 200 Even though the responsibility
to register with the putative father registry must ultimately be borne by an
unwed father, there are specific fact cases which may justify the failure to
register-particularly when that justification is based on fraud.
B. Florida's State Constitutional Right of Privacy and the "Opportunity"
to Develop a Relationship
In Lehr, the United States Supreme Court stated that if the unwed
biological father "grasps that opportunity [to develop a relationship with
his offspring] and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's
future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and
make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. '" 20 1 The
facts in Lehr provided a concrete timeline, making it rather easy to cast
judgment on Mr. Lehr's efforts, or lack thereof, to parent his child. From
the child's birth until the date litigation ensued, Mr. Lehr had over two
years to "grasp the opportunity" of parenthood. 20 2 The Court was not
convinced his actions demonstrated a full commitment to the child,
especially in light of the fact he failed to register with the state registry. 20 3
Given the significant passage of time, there was ample evidence that could
be marshaled and reviewed by the Court in determining whether Mr. Lehr
had converted his inchoate interest into a constitutionally protected right.
Unfortunately, that is not always the case. More particularly, how is an
unwed biological father's commitment to parent a child to be measured
when the child has not yet been born and the unwed biological father is
unaware of the pregnancy? Without the legally presumed knowledge of
pregnancy as set forth in Florida's 2003 Adoption Act, unwed biological
'99 Id. at 690-91.200Id. at 691 (quoting Ellis v. Soc. Servs. Dep't of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980)).
201 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
202 Id. at 250.
203 Id. at 262.
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fathers will now have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, as required in
Stanley.
Does an unwed biological father have a sufficient "opportunity" to
establish a relationship with a newborn child when that child is
immediately placed for adoption at birth by the birth mother? Practically
speaking, there is almost no opportunity to do so given the child's in utero
status. Comparatively, the birth mother has a much greater relationship to
her child as she carries it through the gestational cycle to birth. This is not
an option for an unwed biological father; at best he could provide financial
support within his means as well as emotional support within his capacity
if he is aware of the pregnancy. His ability to support the birth mother
through the pregnancy is premised on his knowledge of the pregnancy and
the birth mother's willingness to accept such support. An unwed
biological father's commitment to his unborn child may objectively exist
through his pre-birth conduct towards the pregnant mother and the child.
Indeed, his relationship to his unborn child can only exist through that
conduct. While it may be possible to judge the conduct of an unwed
biological father towards his unborn child, judging the nature and quality
of any relationship between the two is a highly subjective endeavor at best.
Florida law "recognize[s] the sanctity of the biological connection, and
[that the court must] look carefully at anything that would sever the
biological parent-child link.' '2°4  Prior to the promulgation of Florida's
Putative Father Registry, the Florida Supreme Court had expressly
considered an unwed biological father's conduct towards the mother
during the pregnancy in order to properly evaluate the issue of
abandonment.20 5 In E.A.W., the court expressly considered the father's
lack of emotional support for the mother during her pregnancy and the
court made clear that in order to properly determine if an unwed father has
protected his interest in his unborn child, the trial court must examine the
father's actions to support the mother during the pregnancy.20 6
204 In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 967 (Fla. 1995).
205 See id at 966.
206 See id. The court's inquiry was guided to some extent by the Florida Legislature
because the statutory scheme included consideration of the father's conduct "towards the
child's mother during her pregnancy" when considering abandonment. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.032(1) (West 1995). Similarly, the current version of Chapter 63 compels the Florida
(continued)
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The Supreme Court of Florida first recognized that evidence of a
putative father's pre-birth conduct is relevant to whether he has abandoned
his child in In re Adoption of Doe.207 In Doe, the court specifically relied
on the relationship between the assumption of parental responsibilities and
biological fatherhood as set forth in Lehr.20 8 The court noted that:
[t]he importance of prenatal care to the future mental and
physical health of the child has long been
recognized .... Because prenatal care of the pregnant
mother and unborn child is critical to the well-being of the
child and of society, the biological father, wed or unwed,
has a responsibility to provide support during the prebirth
period.2°9
The court also stated that "the health or well-being of the child is a
continuum which extends back to the pregnancy of the mother., 2
10
Additionally, "[p]roviding prebirth support to the unborn child is a parental
duty. Evidence of whether the parent has or has not furnished customary
support to the pregnant mother is relevant to the issue of abandonment., 21'
In a specially concurring opinion, Justice Barkett wrote "separately to
emphasize that parents may not be stripped of their parental rights
lightly. 2
12
The Florida Supreme Court made clear in Doe and E.A. W that a
putative father's interest in his offspring prior to the child's birth is a fact
issue the trial court must consider for purposes of excusing the father's
consent to an adoption.213 These cases establish the legal precedent
recognized in this jurisdiction-an unwed biological father's constitutional
right and interest in his child pre-birth arises where the father seeks to
courts to examine the pre-birth actions of a father in preserving his relationship to his child.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(2)(b) (West 2005).
207 543 So. 2d 741, 747 (Fla. 1989).
208 Id. at 748-49.
'09 Id. at 746.
210 id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 749 (Barkett, J., concurring).
213 Id. at 746 (majority opinion); see also In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d
961, 966 (Fla. 1995).
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affirmatively protect the relationship.1 4 However, the Florida Legislature
has decided that the substantive constitutional right of an unwed biological
father to his child, as set forth in Doe and E.A. W, now exists exclusively
by virtue of the Florida Putative Father Registry.215 Using the Registry as
the exclusive means to test parental rights is inconsistent with Lehr. The
New York statute at issue in Lehr recognized a variety of means to provide
notice to putative fathers in adoption proceedings, only one of which was
the registry.216
In Heart of Adoptions, Chief Justice Lewis's concurring opinion
recognizes the constitutional significance of an unwed biological father's
opportunity to develop a relationship with his offspring.217 While Chief
Justice Lewis would find a violation of Florida's state constitutional right
of privacy "to preclude [the] opportunity or summarily terminate such a
vested right without notice or meaningful due process, '21 8 it remains
unclear as to when that right materializes as a matter of fact or law. Chief
Justice Lewis understands Lehr to recognize that unmarried biological
fathers do possess a protected interest in the opportunity to establish a
substantial relationship with their offspring.219  This "opportunity" to
develop that relationship must be provided to putative fathers before the
State seeks to terminate their parental rights.220 In order to provide
adequate constitutional protection to unwed biological fathers, they must
be provided actual notice and be given an opportunity to assert or waive
their rights.
22 1
214 In re Adoption of Baby E.A. W., 658 So. 2d at 966-67; In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So.
2d at 746.
215 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054(1) (West 2005) ("[A]n unmarried biological father
must... file ... with the Florida Putative Father Registry.") (emphasis added).
216 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1983).
217 Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 205 (Fla. 2007) (Lewis, C.J.,
concurring).2181 d. at 207.
"19 Id. at 206.
220 id.
221 C.f Gonzalez, supra note 120, at 54 (A mother dropping a child off at a Safe Haven
as permitted in the Florida Statutes also acts as a unilateral termination of parental rights in
that the putative father will never have an opportunity to assert his parental rights post-
birth.).
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The Florida Supreme Court in Heart of Adoptions would apparently
start the "opportunity" clock when an unwed biological father receives
notice of an intended adoption.222 The opportunity clock may start running
months earlier where an unwed biological father has already grasped the
opportunity to parent the child. Although Chief Justice Lewis believes
unwed biological fathers must be afforded the opportunity to form a
substantial relationship, the question remains as to when that opportunity
materializes as a matter of law. If receipt of the notice triggers the
opportunity to form a relationship, then it would seem fruitless to examine
the past conduct of an unwed biological father to support the birth mother
during the pregnancy.223 If the opportunity begins with the notice, then the
prospective conduct of the unwed biological father towards his offspring is
where the court's focus must center.
While the Florida Supreme Court has not articulated when the
"opportunity to grasp" the parental relationship begins, the highest state
court of New York has eloquently articulated the constitutional interest an
unwed birth father has in his newborn child when the birth mother seeks to
place the child for adoption: "[t]he unwed father's protected interest
requires both a biological connection and full parental responsibility; he
must both be a father and behave like one. 224 The Heart of Adoptions
court affirmatively answered the question of whether a putative father is
entitled to a full measure of constitutional protections and entitled to an
opportunity to establish a relationship with a newborn child, absent a
showing of unfitness.225 Chief Justice Lewis recognized that newborn
children present a particular problem given the limited opportunity on the
part of the unwed father to form a relationship with the child in the limited
time after birth and before a birth mother seeks to have the child placed for
adoption.226 In Florida, that time could be limited to forty-eight hours or
less where the birth mother executes a consent for adoption immediately
after birth.227
222 See Heart ofAdoptions, 963 So. 2d at 202.
223 This would contradict the current statutory scheme. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.062(2)(b)(3) (West 2005).
224 In re Raquel Marie X, 559 N.E.2d 418, 424 (N.Y. 1990) (citation omitted).
225 Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 201-02.
226 Id. at 205 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
227 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(4)(b).
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Nonetheless, a father who has promptly taken every available avenue
to demonstrate he is willing and able to enter into the fullest possible
relationship with his under-six-month-old child should also have an fully
protected interest in preventing termination of the relationship by strangers,
228
even if he has not as yet actually been able to form that relationship.
The Raquel court ultimately held that if a qualifying unwed biological
father wished to block a proposed adoption, he must be personally willing
to assume full custody of the child and not simply wish to block to
adoption by others.229 The New York Court of Appeals again affirmed that
in some instances the Constitution protects an unwed father's opportunity
to develop a relationship with his child in Robert 0 v. Russel K.230 This
right properly vests only in those putative fathers who manifest a
willingness to assume full custody of the child and do so promptly.23'
In Heart of Adoptions, Chief Justice Lewis's concurring opinion goes
beyond statutory analysis to address the additional privacy protections set
forth in the Florida Constitution and how those protections extend to
unwed biological fathers.232 Florida's independent Privacy Clause states
that "[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into the person's private life. '233  This right
"embraces more privacy interests, and extends more protection to the
individual in those interests, than does the federal Constitution. 234 Under
both the Federal and Florida Constitutions, parents have a fundamental
liberty interest in rearing their children.235  The United States Supreme
Court's holding in Lehr, coupled with the constitutional privacy
protections found in the Florida Constitution supports the recognition of an
unwed biological father's inchoate interest in the opportunity to form a
228 See In re Raquel Marie X, 559 N.E.2d at 425.
229 Id. at 428.
230 604 N.E.2d 99, 104 (N.Y. 1992).
231 id.
232 Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 206 (Fla. 2007) (Lewis, C.J.,
concurring).
233 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
234 N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 619, 634
(Fla. 2003) (quoting In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989)).
235 See Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996).
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substantial relationship with his child.236 This opportunity cannot be
summarily terminated or denied without meaningful due process of law.237
The United States Supreme Court in Lehr certainly did not impose a
registration requirement on unwed biological fathers who otherwise
grasped the opportunity to parent their child. Where an unwed biological
father has transformed his inchoate interest into a constitutionally protected
relationship with his offspring, the Florida Putative Father Registry
intrudes on the privacy of this relationship by threatening termination for
failure to comply with the additional registration requirements. Having
established a constitutionally recognized and protected relationship, it
would seem legally impermissible under federal and state law to require an
unwed biological father affirmatively establish his plans to care for his
child or face termination of parental rights. Given the fundamental interest
at stake, registration does not appear to be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling governmental interest. The test of registration alone could
easily terminate the constitutionally protected relationship that has been
cultivated by a loving, supportive, and concerned unwed biological father.
Given Florida's additional privacy protections and the federal
constitutional protections granted to unwed biological fathers who grasp
the opportunity to develop a substantial relationship with their offspring, it
appears that formidable arguments exist which suggest that the Florida
Putative Father Registry scheme violates the state and federal
constitutional rights of unwed biological fathers in Florida.
VII. CONCLUSION
While many scholars and adoption practitioners anticipated a due
process showdown between the Supreme Court of Florida and the Florida
Legislature when the state's highest court entertained arguments in Heart
of Adoptions-that was not to be. The Supreme Court of Florida avoided
the constitutional issues altogether and resolved the case based on statutory
construction of chapter 63 and the competing interests contained therein.
In so doing, the court identified the legislative intent of creating adoptions
with finality and stability. The court ultimately determined that such
results could only be achieved where known, locatable unwed biological
fathers receive actual notice of intended adoptions and are afforded notice
236 Heart ofAdoptions, 963 So. 2d at 206 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).23 7 Id. at 207.
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of their obligations set forth in the statute and an opportunity to comply
with those obligations.238
Unwed biological fathers are now entitled to notice of an intended
adoption plan pertaining to their offspring as well as notice of their
obligations set forth in section 63.062 of the Florida Statutes.239 While
unwed biological fathers may still be presumed to have knowledge of their
obligations as set forth in chapter 63, this presumption no longer serves to
deny unwed biological fathers actual notice of intended adoptions. In
Heart of Adoptions, the Florida Supreme Court expressly quashed a
number of circuit court opinions to the extent those opinions were
inconsistent with the court's current statutory construction of Chapter
63.240
The Heart of Adoptions ruling provides new protections for unwed
biological fathers-namely, actual notice of their rights and information
related to the Florida Putative Father Registry. Arguably these protections
may come at the expense of adoption stability and finality due to the fact
an unmarried biological father may now be given the chance to step
forward and assert his claim to a child that would have otherwise been
available for adoption.241  As unwed biological fathers grasp the
opportunity to parent their children, fewer children may ultimately be
available for adoption. Where they do not accept some responsibility for
their offspring after proper notice, there can be no doubt that such failure
supports the birth mother's decision to place her child for adoption. While
it is clearly difficult to balance the competing interests in adoption cases,
actual notice to unwed biological fathers can only be a step in the right
direction.
Beyond the Court's opinion in Heart of Adoptions, there are lingering
questions as to an unwed biological father's opportunity to parent his child,
especially in light of the state constitutional right of privacy in Florida.
These questions will remain unanswered for now, but they will most
certainly remain relevant for future challenges to the Florida Putative
Father Registry.
238 Id. at 200 (majority opinion).
2 39 Id. at 202.
240 See id. at 203.
241 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.054(1), 63.062(2)(b)(1) (West 2005).
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